Methodology and Sources
uVidNova is a project-finance-grade atlas. Every figure on this platform is traceable to a specific published source. No number is AI-generated. The platform’s value lies in integrating authoritative external data, not in inventing it.
1. Cost and Financing Methodology
1.1 Deterministic Cost Formula
All reconstruction cost estimates are computed deterministically by formula. The AI orchestrator used on this platform (which classifies damage records and generates narrative summaries) never produces a numeric output. Every number in every cost field is obtained by lookup against published benchmark tables, computed in scripts/compute-costs.js.
| Variable | Range / value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| unit_cost | USD per m², MW, km, bed or unit — depends on asset_type |
data/unit_cost_table.json. Each row carries a source code and vintage_year. Primary sources: [RDNA3] [KSE] [EBRD_CASE] |
| physical_quantity | m², MW, km, beds, tonnes — depends on asset_type |
The physical_specs field for each asset. Every value is wrapped { value, source, ref }, where source ∈ extracted_from_source, estimated_from_photo, pending_data, modelled. Assets with pending_data specs return only a low/high range, flagged as provisional. |
| destruction_factor | light: 0.10–0.25 · moderate: 0.30–0.55 · severe: 0.60–0.85 · destroyed: 0.95–1.10 | data/destruction_factors.json. Ranges calibrated to RDNA3 damage-level definitions and EBRD case-study repair-to-cost ratios. [RDNA3] [EBRD_CASE] |
| regional_multiplier | Varies by oblast. Frontline regions: higher logistics premium. Western regions: at or below 1.00×. | data/regional_multipliers.json. Derived from RDNA3 regional cost variation analysis and EBRD Ukraine programme procurement premia. [RDNA3] [EBRD_CASE] |
| path_multiplier | Baseline: 1.00× · Code-compliant: 1.15–1.25× · Build-back-better: 1.30–1.60× | data/path_multipliers.json. Derived from EU energy-efficiency and accessibility compliance cost data and the RDNA3 build-back-better scenario analysis. [RDNA3] [EU_FACILITY] |
| contingency | 1.15 (15%) for assessed assets · 1.25 (25%) for documented-only assets | Standard post-conflict project-finance contingency reserve, consistent with World Bank Ukraine public procurement guidelines. [RDNA3] |
The {low, central, high} triple is generated by simultaneously walking the low and high ends of each multiplier range — not by applying the formula to the central value of each input separately:
- low = formula(all inputs at their lower bounds simultaneously)
- high = formula(all inputs at their upper bounds simultaneously)
- central = arithmetic mean of low and high
This follows the RDNA3 uncertainty-range methodology and avoids artificially narrowing the range by mixing low and high assumptions from different inputs. [RDNA3]
1.2 Heritage Premium
Assets classified under heritage.* carry a separate conservation-premium multiplier applied after the standard formula. This multiplier reflects the cost of traditional materials, specialist craft, archaeological monitoring, and UNESCO/Council of Europe conservation standards not captured in standard unit costs.
| Heritage condition | Premium multiplier |
|---|---|
| Largely intact (light–moderate damage, recoverable structure) | 1.8×–2.2× |
| Substantially destroyed, documentary record survives | 2.2×–2.6× |
| Destroyed, contested historical record, exceptional significance | 2.6×–3.0× |
The heritage premium is held in a separate table in data/unit_cost_table.json and is not folded into the general regional multiplier. Any asset receiving this premium displays it explicitly on the “show cost formula” panel on the asset detail page.
1.3 Three Reconstruction Paths
Each asset is costed across three paths. The path multiplier adjusts unit cost and unlocks different technology overlays and financing structures.
| Path | Definition | Multiplier | Financing logic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline | Repair or rebuild to pre-war condition and pre-war technical standard. | 1.00× | Lower grant share; less EU conditionality leverage to activate. |
| Code-compliant | Rebuild to current EU and Ukrainian codes: structural, energy, accessibility, and fire standards. | 1.15–1.25× | EU Facility conditionality partially activated; standard concessional mix. |
| Build-back-better | Code-compliant plus named technology overlays — microgrids, passive energy standard, mass timber, fibre, telemedicine, green steel, modular clinical units. Full catalogue in data/tech_overlays.json. |
1.30–1.60× | Maximum EU grant share via Pillar I green and accessibility conditionalities; EBRD Green Economy concessional; higher first-loss guarantee leverage. |
The build-back-better path costs more in absolute terms but typically attracts a higher grant percentage, reducing Ukraine’s concessional and equity balance-sheet burden. All three paths are displayed side by side so users can assess the trade-off directly. [EU_FACILITY] [RDNA3]
1.4 Anti-Hallucination Architecture
An invented reconstruction cost cited in an EBRD, EIB, or government team publication would be a reputational failure. The architecture eliminates this risk structurally, not merely through prompt instruction.
- Stage 1 — Classification. The LLM extracts structured fields from OSINT inputs:
asset_type,physical_specs.*,damage.destruction_level,wartime_status.*. All numeric specs are tagged with source provenance. Uncertain values default topending_data. Temperature: 0.2. - Stage 2 — Retrieval and narration. The server performs all deterministic lookups and computes the cost formula. The LLM receives the complete structured payload and narrates it. It may rephrase; it may not introduce numbers absent from the payload. Temperature: 0.4.
- Validation gate. Every numeric token in the narration is regex-extracted and matched against the payload (with formatting tolerance). Any unmatched numeric token halts publication and routes the record to human review. Dates are whitelisted; financial and physical-quantity tokens are not. Implemented in
functions/lib/validation-gate.js.
System prompts are versioned in functions/_shared/prompts/ as Markdown files. No prompts are hardcoded in JS string literals.
2. Authoritative Reference Sources
Every figure in the register must cite at least one of these sources using the short code noted below. New sources require a pull request to docs/sources.md. The full bibliography, including EBRD project IDs and working-paper references, is maintained in that file.
| Code | Full reference |
|---|---|
RDNA3 |
World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission, United Nations. Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, Third Edition. February 2024. The canonical benchmark for sector-level unit costs, damage-quantification methodology, and reconstruction path multipliers. Central finding: total recovery needs of USD 486 billion as of Q4 2023. |
KSE |
Kyiv School of Economics Institute. “Russia Will Pay” damage tracker and methodology. Updated periodically. Primary source for asset-level damage records, oblast-level cost totals, and sector damage aggregates. uVidNova validates central cost values against KSE where asset-level data is available; divergences greater than ±15% are flagged in docs/methodology.md. |
EBRD_CASE |
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Ukraine reconstruction case studies, various dates. Source for financing-structure precedents, concessional loan terms, regional cost variation parameters, and capital-structure templates. EBRD is the largest single MFI lender to Ukraine and provides the primary comparables for deal structures. |
EU_FACILITY |
European Union. Ukraine Facility programme documents (EUR 50 billion, 2024–27). Ukraine Plan reform and reconstruction milestones; Pillar I non-repayable grants; Pillar II guarantee-window conditionalities. Source for grant conditionalities that drive elevated financing under build-back-better and the ERA loan framework agreement. |
EIB_UA |
European Investment Bank. EU4Ukraine investment platform documentation. Source for EIB concessional lending terms, co-financing structures, and the over EUR 1.5 billion emergency lending portfolio extended to Ukraine since February 2022. |
MIGA |
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. War and Civil Disturbance insurance product documentation, Ukraine portfolio. Coverage scope (equity investors, lenders, contractors), pricing parameters, eligible operations, and the Ukraine portfolio target volume announced at the 2023 Ukraine Recovery Conference. |
OCHA |
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Ukraine flash updates and humanitarian needs overviews. Used for damage verification, displacement data, and access-constraint information affecting rebuildability classification. |
BELLINGCAT |
Bellingcat / Centre for Information Resilience. Verified incident mapping and open-source intelligence analysis, Ukraine. Used for independent corroboration of damage incidents, particularly for assets in occupied territory where official sources are unavailable. |
ACLED |
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. Ukraine conflict event data, updated weekly. Used to verify incident type and location, and as a secondary check on damage.incident_date and damage.incident_type fields. |
eRECOVERY |
Government of Ukraine. eRecovery / DREAM platform (Diia.Recovery for Economic Assistance in Municipalities). Official Ukrainian government damage register and reconstruction project tracker. Used for lifecycle status updates, official project identifiers, and government-approved cost estimates. |
3. Financing Structure Methodology
3.1 Tranche Taxonomy
Ukraine’s reconstruction capital stack is more granular than a simple grant/debt split. The platform uses a 12-tier taxonomy ordered from most concessional to most commercial. Any reconstruction deal can be expressed as a combination of these tranches; percentage allocations within a deal must sum to 100. Political risk insurance (PRI) is modelled as a credit enhancement — a boolean flag with named providers — not as a capital percentage tranche.
Sovereign and grant tranches
| Tranche | Code | Definition and typical range |
|---|---|---|
| Pure grants | grant_pct |
Non-repayable. EU Ukraine Facility Pillar I, bilateral grants (KfW/BMZ, legacy USAID, FCDO, JICA), UN agency grants, EU UNESCO/Creative Europe for heritage. 40–70% for social infrastructure; near zero for revenue-generating assets. [EU_FACILITY] [RDNA3] |
| ERA / frozen-asset proceeds | era_pct |
G7 ERA loan proceeds secured against interest accruing on immobilised Russian sovereign reserves (approximately USD 50 billion total). Repayment contingent on Russian reparations — functionally equivalent to a grant from Ukraine’s balance-sheet perspective. Distinguished as a separate tranche because the political conditionality differs from EU Facility grants. [EU_FACILITY] |
| First-loss / guarantee capital | first_loss_pct |
Donor-subordinated tranches that absorb initial impairment, enabling commercial capital to deploy above. EU Facility Pillar II guarantee window, EBRD RSF first-loss sleeves, DFC first loss. Typically 5–15% of the stack by size, but performs disproportionate leverage work. [EU_FACILITY] [EBRD_CASE] |
DFI and IFI tranches
| Tranche | Code | Definition and typical range |
|---|---|---|
| IFI concessional debt | concessional_pct |
Long-tenor debt (20–40 years) with grace periods at sub-market pricing. World Bank, EBRD concessional window, EIB EU4Ukraine, AIIB, NIB; bilateral: KfW Entwicklungsbank, AFD, JICA. Typically 25–45% in blended-finance social and municipal infrastructure. The primary tier. [EBRD_CASE] [EIB_UA] |
| IFI senior debt (near-market) | senior_ifi_pct |
Senior EBRD, EIB, IFC loans for revenue-generating assets: generation capacity, telecoms, port concessions, agro-export logistics. Pricing slightly below commercial. Carries policy conditionality (governance, procurement, ESG). Predominantly post-ceasefire or for assets with clear offtake structures. [EBRD_CASE] [EIB_UA] |
| DFI equity and quasi-equity | dfi_equity_pct |
IFC equity, EBRD direct equity, DFC equity, EU4Ukraine equity sleeve. Subordinated debt, convertible notes, preference shares placed here. Used for restructured PPPs, PPP concessionaires, anchor private sponsors. [EBRD_CASE] |
| ECA buyer credit / direct lending | eca_pct |
Export credit agency instruments: UKEF, Bpifrance, Euler Hermes/SACE, EKF. Pre-ceasefire: 30–50% of announced capacity. Expands materially post-ceasefire as bank syndication deepens. [MIGA] |
Sovereign and private tranches
| Tranche | Code | Definition and typical range |
|---|---|---|
| Sovereign / municipal counterpart equity | public_equity_pct |
Ukrainian government and oblast/municipal authority contribution. Often partly in-kind (land, existing structure, regulatory permits at assessed value), partly budgetary. IFIs typically require 10–30%. [RDNA3] [EBRD_CASE] |
| Diaspora capital and patriotic bonds | diaspora_pct |
Ukrainian war bonds (hryvnia and FX), diaspora bond issuance modelled on Israeli and Irish precedents. 2–5% pre-ceasefire; grows materially post-ceasefire. Confidence: low. [EBRD_CASE] |
| Commercial bank senior debt | commercial_debt_pct |
Pre-ceasefire: almost exclusively via IFI A/B structures where the IFI is the lender of record and preferred-creditor status passes to B-loan banks. Standalone bank syndicates return post-ceasefire. Confidence: low pre-ceasefire. [EBRD_CASE] |
| Institutional / capital markets debt | institutional_debt_pct |
EU insurers and pension funds (Solvency II/matching adjustment), large UK annuity markets, North American pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, global infra-debt funds. Most policy-sensitive tranche: EU accession stall compresses capacity 40–60%; acceleration multiplies by 1.5×. Confidence: low. [EU_FACILITY] |
| Private equity / infrastructure funds | private_equity_pct |
Ukraine-dedicated funds (Horizon Capital, Dragon Capital), regional EM infrastructure, global infrastructure with impact mandate. Mostly post-ceasefire or for narrow asset classes (telecoms, logistics) where revenue visibility justifies risk today. Confidence: low. [EBRD_CASE] |
3.2 Template Assignment — Sector × Path Matrix
Capital-structure templates in data/financing_templates.json are indexed by sector × path. When an asset record specifies both, the platform selects the matching template as the default stack, with per-asset overrides permitted where named comparable projects justify deviation. Grant percentage central tendencies in the matrix:
| Sector group | Grant baseline % | Grant code-compliant % | Grant BBB % | BBB rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Healthcare, education, heritage, water & sanitation | 30% | 40% | 55% | EU Pillar I green and accessibility conditionality [EU_FACILITY] |
| Housing (district-scale) | 25% | 35% | 45% | EU Social Pillar + EBRD Green Cities concessional [EBRD_CASE] |
| Energy — generation and grid | 10% | 20% | 30% | EU renewable-transition grant + EBRD Green Economy [EU_FACILITY] |
| Transport — revenue-generating (ports, toll roads) | 10% | 15% | 20% | PPP concession structure limits grant share [EBRD_CASE] |
| Transport — non-revenue (rail, bridges) | 30% | 35% | 40% | EU connectivity fund; public-good character [EU_FACILITY] |
| Industrial (steel, coke, agro-processing) | 5% | 10% | 15% | Private credit; requires strategic investor [EBRD_CASE] |
| Public administration | 55% | 60% | 65% | EU Facility institutional-reform track [EU_FACILITY] |
Full templates, including all 12 tranche allocations, PRI wrapper flags, and structure templates, are in data/financing_templates.json. Template rationales per sector are documented in docs/financing_tranches.md.
3.3 Wartime Compression Rules
In pre-ceasefire conditions, commercial capital tranches are materially compressed relative to the peacetime template. Rules from data/wartime_adjustment_rules.json:
| Tranche | Pre-ceasefire retention share | Remainder redirected to |
|---|---|---|
| Commercial bank debt | 30% | IFI concessional debt |
| Institutional debt | 20% | 50% ERA proceeds, 50% IFI concessional debt |
| Private equity | 30% | 60% DFI equity, 40% grant |
PRI wrapping is mandatory for all retained commercial bank debt, institutional debt, and private equity in the pre-ceasefire state. The rationale is risk pricing: under active conflict, commercial lenders face loss scenarios that are uninsurable at standard premia without IFI first-loss and guarantee layers. Adjustments are based on EBRD Ukraine portfolio deal structures and bilateral ECA utilisation rates. [EBRD_CASE] [MIGA]
In post-armistice fragile conditions, compression eases to 60% retention for commercial debt and private equity. Full reversion to peacetime templates requires sustained peace and a low or elevated sovereign risk band.
3.4 Confidence Levels
| Level | Tranches | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| High | Pure grants, ERA proceeds, PRI wrapper, ECA buyer credit | Capacity figures explicitly stated in programme documents of named sources. Confirmed in published policy commitments. |
| Medium | First-loss capital, IFI concessional debt, IFI senior debt, DFI equity, sovereign equity | Aggregate commitments announced; deployment ratios and project-level allocations inferred from comparable deal structures. |
| Low | Diaspora bonds, commercial bank debt, institutional debt, private equity | Estimated from analogues and fund manager soundings. Post-ceasefire figures are theoretical capacity modelling, not confirmed commitments. |
Low-confidence tranches carry the widest uncertainty bands and are most sensitive to the EU accession trajectory and peace-state scenario. The Finance tool exposes scenario toggles for these variables.
4. Reconstruction Trust Methodology
The Reconstruction Trust is a model construct: a financing mechanism that would allow reconstruction to begin now against a future stream of reparations proceeds, rather than waiting for a lump-sum settlement after political resolution. This section explains the mechanism, its historical precedents, and how it is parameterised on this platform.
4.1 Historical Precedents
Dawes Plan (1924) and Young Plan (1929) — annuity-backed reconstruction financing
After Germany’s default on First World War reparations in 1923, the Dawes Committee restructured obligations into long-term annuities secured against railway revenues, industrial bonds, and a first charge on the state budget. The Reparations Agent (S. Parker Gilbert) held access to German revenue streams and authority to issue bonds on international capital markets backed by those streams. Between 1924 and 1929 Germany raised approximately USD 800 million in foreign loans on this basis — funds that financed industrial reconstruction — while the reparations annuity was met from operating revenues rather than a lump sum Germany could never have assembled.
The Young Plan (1929) further commercialised the structure: Germany issued bonds directly on international markets, and the Bank for International Settlements — founded simultaneously — acted as trustee. The very existence of the BIS is a legacy of this annuity-backed structure.
Key lesson: annuity-backed structures allow reconstruction to begin before the underlying obligation is resolved. The creditor receives a stream; the debtor finances reconstruction from the same asset generating that stream. Lump-sum settlement is not a precondition for productive use of the obligation.
Marshall Plan (1948–51) — conditioned multi-year disbursement
The European Recovery Programme disbursed USD 13.3 billion (approximately USD 160 billion in 2024 prices) across 16 European countries in four annual tranches from 1948 to 1952. Critically, this was not a one-off transfer but a multi-year availability commitment: recipient countries knew volume and schedule in advance, enabling investment plans, procurement pipelines, and counterpart budget allocations to be set years before actual receipt.
The programme was conditioned on two things: economic-policy reform (the OEEC coordination mechanism, the OECD’s predecessor) and trade liberalisation among recipients. It is the combination of conditioned disbursement and multi-year commitment that is the structural feature distinguishing the Marshall Plan from both the unconditional reparations transfers that preceded the Second World War and the debt restructuring that followed.
Key lesson: a known, defined, multi-year disbursement schedule is more useful to reconstruction planners than a small uncertain lump sum or a series of ad-hoc tranches. The EU Ukraine Facility replicates this structure with a EUR 50 billion seven-year envelope and annual milestone-based tranches. [EU_FACILITY]
UN Compensation Commission (1991–2022) — stream-based collection mechanism
The UNCC administered Iraq’s reparations to Kuwait and other claimants via a levy on Iraq’s oil-export revenues, initially set at 30% of receipts under the UN Oil-for-Food Programme. Over 31 years the Commission processed 2.68 million claims and disbursed approximately USD 52.4 billion. Iraq’s final payment was made in February 2022.
The UNCC mechanism demonstrated three things directly relevant to Ukraine. First, a percentage-of-revenue levy is practically more collectable over time than a demand for immediate lump-sum payment: Iraq could not have paid USD 52 billion in 1991, but could sustain a 25–30% levy over three decades. Second, a multilateral trustee with independent arbitration authority under the UN Security Council provided sufficient legitimacy for claimants to accept the process rather than pursue parallel paths. Third, stream-based structures could in principle support front-loaded financing: annual collection proceeds could underwrite bonds issued against the projected 30-year revenue stream, had the political will been present.
Key lesson: a stream-based mechanism — a percentage of a predictable revenue flow — proved practically more collectable over time than a lump-sum demand. For Ukraine, the analogous stream is the interest accruing on frozen Russian sovereign reserves, with principal seizure as the upside scenario.
4.2 Sovereign Wealth Fund Parallel — Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global
Norway’s GPFG is the closest structural analogue to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust. The fund holds approximately USD 1.6 trillion in assets (2024), derived from North Sea oil extraction revenues, and is managed under a rule that caps annual disbursements at the expected real return — originally 4%, revised to approximately 3% of fund market value. Annual parliamentary appropriations cannot exceed this ceiling except in extraordinary circumstances. The rule creates a fund that can deliver a predictable annual disbursement without eroding corpus.
The structural parallel: a corpus derived from a windfall asset (frozen Russian reserves rather than oil revenues), managed under a disbursement rule (2.5%–5.0% depending on political will), that converts the corpus into an annual availability payment that is known, predictable, and plannable. This is precisely the feature that Marshall Plan experience shows to be most valuable to reconstruction planners: not the size of the transfer, but its predictability.
The GPFG parallel also illustrates the governance requirement. Norway’s rule works because it is legislated, administered by an independent manager (Norges Bank Investment Management), and subject to annual parliamentary scrutiny. A Ukraine Trust would require analogous governance — multilateral trusteeship, independent management, and regular public reporting — to provide the confidence on which institutional investors would rely when financing reconstruction projects against anticipated Trust disbursements.
4.3 Trust Mechanism as Modelled in uVidNova
| Parameter | Value / assumption | Source / basis |
|---|---|---|
| Corpus | Frozen Russian sovereign reserves transferred under international trusteeship. Central estimate: USD 280–300 billion principal. Platform default scenario: USD 50 billion ERA proceeds only (G7 ERA loan against accrued interest). | G7 ERA agreement; public reporting on immobilised Euroclear holdings. [EU_FACILITY] |
| Disbursement rate | 2.5%–5.0% of corpus per annum. Default: 4.0%. | Calibrated to GPFG disbursement rule and UNCC levy precedent. |
| Annual availability payment | corpus × drawdown_pct × (1 − operating_cost_pct). At USD 286 billion corpus, 4.0% drawdown, 0.1% operating costs: approximately USD 11.4 billion/year. |
Model construct. Formula in data/trust/trust_config.json. |
| Nominal corpus return | 4.0% (ECB AAA-rated eurozone sovereign average, 5-year duration, 2026-Q1 vintage). | data/trust/trust_config.json. Source: ECB yield-curve data. |
| Use of availability payments | Annual Trust disbursements service concessional debt raised to finance reconstruction projects in the current period, rather than waiting for political resolution of a lump-sum reparations claim. | Mechanism design; draws on UNCC and Dawes Plan precedents. |
| Financing multiplier | USD 1 of annual Trust availability supports approximately USD 5 of upfront project financing via concessional debt (at 5.0% coupon, 25-year tenor, DSCR 1.25). Sector-specific parameters in data/availability_payment_params.json. |
Standard project-finance sizing at sector-specific coupon rates. [EBRD_CASE] |
The annuity arithmetic illustrates why the Trust structure matters. A 4% disbursement on USD 286 billion equals approximately USD 11.4 billion per year — a contracted annual stream, as opposed to an uncertain and politically fraught lump-sum settlement prospect. At a 5× financing multiplier, this stream supports approximately USD 57 billion in reconstruction investment per year without any political agreement on the total reparations figure.
In the platform’s current default scenario (proceeds only, pre-ceasefire), the ERA envelope is approximately USD 50 billion in total — a one-time financing pool against accrued interest, not an annual stream. The principal-seizure scenario (USD 280–300 billion corpus) unlocks the annuity logic and its financing multiplier. Users can toggle between these scenarios in the Finance tool.
4.4 Disclaimer — Trust Mechanism
The Reconstruction Trust mechanism described on this platform is a model construct based on historical precedents and current legal proposals. It does not reflect confirmed government policy, a concluded international agreement, or any specific legislative or judicial determination regarding frozen Russian sovereign assets.
The legality, enforceability, and quantum of any Ukrainian reparations claim against the Russian Federation remain contested under international law. The platform takes no position on these legal questions. Trust corpus and availability-payment figures are scenario assumptions for financing-structure modelling, not forecasts or legal assessments.
Users incorporating Trust mechanism assumptions into transaction models, investment memoranda, or public communications should clearly note the conditional and illustrative nature of these figures.
5. Disclaimer
Cost estimates and financing structures. Cost and financing-structure figures on this platform are estimates derived from published unit-cost benchmarks (RDNA3, KSE Institute) and named comparable Ukrainian precedents. They are not guarantees, not procurement quotes, and not a substitute for transaction-level due diligence. Actual project costs will depend on scope, procurement, timing, site conditions, contractor market conditions, and the political-security environment at the time of execution.
Re-damaged assets. Assets with re_damage_count ≥ 2 are flagged with a warning indicator on the map and on the asset detail page. This is a material investor-information field: re-damage events affect insurance pricing, schedule risks, and the case for hardened build-back-better projects. Re-damaged assets are not hidden or discounted — they are documented with full transparency, because concealing this information would undermine the platform’s purpose.
Occupied and frontline-adjacent assets. Assets classified as occupied or frontline-adjacent are documented in the register as “pipeline only.” They are excluded from the default map view and from aggregated cost and financing-capacity figures. The rebuildability filter exposes them for planning purposes. No reconstruction financing deployment for these assets in current conditions is modelled.
Data vintage. RDNA3 is the third edition from February 2024; subsequent damage is not incorporated into the unit-cost tables or regional multipliers. The KSE “Russia Will Pay” tracker is updated periodically; figures shown reflect the version current at the last_reviewed date of each asset record. No real-time data feeds are used. This is a register, not a wire service.
Independence. uVidNova is a non-profit platform. It receives no commission from any financial institution, donor, or government body. It has no affiliation with the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank, EBRD, EIB, or any other institution whose data it cites. Citations do not imply endorsement by those institutions.
Corrections. If you identify a factual error, a missing source citation, a figure that does not match its stated reference, or an asset that should be in the register, please use the feedback button on the map page. Corrections are reviewed and recorded as verified pull requests. All data is version-controlled and publicly auditable.
uVidNova is built and maintained by Samir Asadov, CFA. For partnership enquiries from KSE analysts, EBRD investment officers, or policy researchers, please use the feedback form on the map page.
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